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Imperialism and Hegemony:
Some Historical Reflections

by Keith Sewell

F

or the historian nothing ever totally goes away,
except for those events for which no evidence
has survived and that have, therefore, become
permanently lost to all human recollection. Other
than events and developments in this category, the
great movements of human history from ancient,
classical, medieval, and modern times—and much
more besides— are under constant scrutiny. Of
course, it is possible to see these great eras, and the
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immense historical developments that took place
in them, as continually receding from that point
of experience between past and future that we call
“the present.” Yet that “past” never completely
goes away: tradition ensures that we carry with
us a great deal of baggage from human history.
Assessed from a biblical standard, traditions might
be variously judged, but without tradition there can
be no continuity in human history. And there are
episodes or epochs or institutions in the human
past that we might think have received some sort
of historical burial, but they can surprise us by reemerging unexpectedly in a new form. When I was
an undergraduate, it was emphasized that we lived
in a post-colonial era. Imperialism was finished.
That was then; this is now: empire is back.1
The Idea of Empire: Rome and After
The idea of empire has been with us for a long
time. In the West, our notion of empire has arisen
from the awe with which successive generations
beheld the grandeur and legacy of Rome. For
centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire in the
West, men tended to see Rome as an ideal to which
they ought to aspire. The Roman imperium was
the yardstick of greatness. It was the inspiration
for the Holy Roman Empire (sacrum romanum
imperium), which had a continuous existence
from its reconstitution by Otto I in 962 until its
abolition by Napoleon in 1806.2 English overseas
colonial expansion arose in the context of the “old
imperialism,” led by the navigators of Portugal and
the Spanish conquistadores. Early English maritime
adventurism and colonialism came to exhibit a
strongly Protestant mode of self-justification,

with its declared right to challenge any presumed
Catholic monopoly across the seas.3 At the same
time, it is worth remembering that empires have
not always been in vogue. The United States often
saw itself, and self-defined its distinctiveness, in
terms of a repudiation of empire. In England, in
the same year as the Declaration of Independence (1776),
Adam Smith published his Wealth of Nations, which
seemed to imply that empire was not necessary for
prosperity,4 and Edward Gibbon his Decline and Fall
of the Roman Empire, which suggested that empires
tended towards corruption and disintegration.5

The United States was long
the home of anti- (British)
imperial sentiment.
The United States was long the home of anti(British) imperial sentiment. After the Great
War (1914-18) various American writers were
quick to argue that competitive imperialism had
contributed to the coming of that disastrous
conflict.6 In the United Kingdom itself, by the
1930s, British left-wing thought especially was
increasingly embarrassed by the racism and
exploitation that imperialism seemed to entail, in
part because such practices were explicitly endorsed
by an increasingly powerful continental European
Fascism.7 It was in this era that Winston Churchill
found that his opposition to constitutional advance
in India towards self-government was politically
disadvantageous.8 After the fall of France, in 1940,
Great Britain faced Germany and Italy alone, apart
from the support she received from within her
Empire. But lands such as Canada, South Africa,
Australia, and New Zealand were too remote and
too thinly populated to offset the full weight of a
European continent dominated by Nazi Germany.
Of necessity, Great Britain sought support from
a U.S.A. led by President Roosevelt. It eventually
arrived, but only in full force after Nazi Germany
declared war on the U.S.A. in the wake of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
It was at this time that Great Britain felt the
full impact of American anti-imperialism. Pulling
Britain’s imperial chestnuts out of the fire was

definitely not part of the American taxpayer’s
responsibilities, and there was soon talk from
Washington that the European colonial empires
should be placed under some sort of international
control.9 As might be imagined, this was deeply
resented in London. To the British this seemed
both self-serving and hypocritical. Washington
need not have worried. In truth, the British Empire,
between 1922 (Ireland) and 1998 (Hong Kong),
gradually faded away. The Statute of Westminster,
1931 (an act of the British parliament), set “the
Dominions,” such as Canada, Australia and New
Zealand, on the road to independent statehood. All
ties between them and “the mother country” were
to be voluntary. Great Britain, since the Durham
Report of 1839, had learned to heed the prescient
advice of Edmund Burke in his “Reconciliation
with America” (1775).10
The Passing of the British Empire
The high-point of popular imperial sentiment
in Great Britain itself had come at the outbreak
of the South African War in 1899. The bitterness
and disappointments of that conflict brought
imperial disillusionment.11 After 1900, British
politics became more preoccupied with welfare
and defense at home than with expansion beyond
the seas. The revival of imperial sentiment during
the bloodletting of the Great War (1914-1918)
was official rather than heartfelt. After 1919, the
country was enfeebled, and the diplomatic unity of
the British Empire could no longer be assumed.
In 1921, Lloyd George, at the time of the Chanak
Crisis with Turkey, found that the old methods
no longer worked. Bonar Law, the Conservative
leader at that time, declared that “We cannot act
alone as the policeman of the world.”12 In 1919-20
Great Britain and France, as victor powers, both
managed to make a colossal miscalculation. They
allowed themselves to presume that if they were
weary and ill-disposed towards further expansion,
then everyone else would stop behaving the way
they had behaved in the nineteenth century. But
others were far from satiated. In truth, the British
and French governments could no more freeze the
status quo in the world of 1919 than could Metternich
in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815.
And even in 1919, the implications of the Amritsar
(Jallianwala Bagh) massacre in India were clear:
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either Great Britain would have to choose between
measured change across her widely-scattered
empire, leading to self-government, or she could
strive to maintain her position, even if doing so
entailed severe repression and wading through the
blood of rebellious subjects. After 1919, it became
clear that the British electorate had no taste for the
latter course.
The fall of France in June 1940 left Great
Britain without a single great power ally. She was
hard-pressed to defend herself against a Germany
that now controlled a significant portion of Europe
and an Italy that presumed for herself dominance
in the Mediterranean and East Africa.13 This is why
Britain found herself dependent on America in
1940, a situation ultimately incompatible with the
maintenance of her empire. The British nightmare
was to confront three great powers single-handedly:
Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean,
and Japan in East Asia. The full nightmare finally
materialized in December 1941, but deliverance
came at the same time because when Japan struck
at Great Britain in Hong Kong and Malaya, she
also struck at the United States in the Philippines
and at Pearl Harbor. This brought the manpower,
resources, and prodigious productive capacity
of the United States into the conflict against the
Axis and on the side of Great Britain and Soviet
Russia. This was the era in which the United States,
already a great power, flexed her muscles and clearly
became a global power.14
If the British Empire ever went with a
resounding crash, it was at the fall of Singapore
to Japan in February 1942.15 The importance of
this catastrophe was perhaps obscured by the
curious after-life that the British Empire enjoyed
for at time after 1945, in some areas even on into
the 1960s. But the tide was definitely running out.
The Second World War produced a significant
wave of pro-Dominion (i.e., Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, and South Africa) sentiment in
Great Britain but no renewals of anything like a
commitment to empire as such.
After 1945, the old sort of imperialism became
internationally passé. The two emergent “superpowers,” the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., were both
officially “anti-imperialist.” They were not generally
seen as empires at this time because imperialism
still tended to be equated with the colonial empires
of Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
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Spain, and Portugal. These empires were passing.
India and Pakistan became independent in 1947,
Burma and Ceylon in 1948.16
It is in these years that the passing of the Pax
Britannica and the arrival of the Pax Americana
took place,17 perhaps best exemplified in Britain’s
February 1947 statement to Washington of her
inability to continue to provide aid to Greece and
Turkey and in the consequential statement of the
“Truman Doctrine.”18 If America did not exactly
step into Britain’s shoes, she often found herself
stepping into her place.
The British Debate on Empire
The last expansion-affirming, self-congratulating
account of the British Empire taken at all seriously
appeared in 1950.19 Thereafter, the de-colonization
of sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asian, and the
Caribbean and South Pacific island territories
proceeded a-pace from 1957 onwards. In some
places the process was far too rushed, the
responsibilities of “independence” came too soon,
and the consequences included immense loss of
life.20 The story of the end of empire has been told
constitutionally by Nicholas Mansergh,21 politically
and strategically by Max Beloff,22 belligerently by
Corelli Barnett,23 and aesthetically by James Morris
in a renowned trilogy.24
In Great Britain itself, in the 1950s and 1960s,
what little was left of the British imperial spirit
was subjected to withering criticism from within.25
In retrospect it seemed that a mighty battle had
been fought between William Ewart Gladstone
(1809-98) and Benjamin Disraeli (1804-81)
over Great Britain’s posture in the world. Was
it to be free trade and prosperity or territorial
aggrandizement by imperial expansion? The
former led to standing with Russia against the Turk
in defense of European civilization, the latter with
the Turk against Russia for reasons of imperial
security.26 Although Gladstone, “the Grand Old
Man,” outlived the “Tory” Disraeli, it was the
imperial vision of the latter that won the day—but
only for the time being, for things were to look
very different after the South African War of 1899
and Great War of 1914.
It was not until the 1960s that the idea of empire
first received the scholarly attention it surely merits,
in the form of Richard Koebner’s writings on
Empire (1961) and Imperialism (1964). Koebner’s work

was of great breadth and profound scholarship.27
He drew attention to a number of salient points.
At the time of the Reformation, parliament laid
statutory claim to an imperial status for England in
repudiation of any Papal claims.28 For a long time,
when Englishmen spoke of “the empire,” they
often meant England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales,
rather than an array of far-flung colonies. And
deep into the nineteenth century, British sentiment
was suspicious of “imperialism” as too reminiscent
of the empire of Napoleon. Disraeli’s “Empire of
India,” with Victoria taking the title of “Empress
of India,” was a late innovation, distasteful to
many Englishmen because it carried too close an
association with oriental despotism.
Koebner’s work was published in a period that
saw a great flowering of literature on the history,
character, and motivations of the British Empire.
This literature came to a peak from the 1950s
to the mid-1970s, even as the empire was itself
was fading rapidly. Much arose from the seminal
paper by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson
on “The Imperialism of Free Trade.”29 Was
there a new imperialism in the late nineteenth
century? What was its character? How much
was its expansion driven by the imperial capital,
and how much by the need to respond to the
challenging exigencies of the imperial frontier?
How is this late-nineteenth-century expansion
of empire to be explained, given the end of the
(mercantilist) “old colonial system” on which
the (post-Yorktown) “second British Empire”
was originally based, thanks to the rise of “free
trade”?30 How therefore did “free trade” function
in relation to empire? Was “free trade” really
anti-colonial empire? In his influential lectures
on British global expansion, J. R. Seeley famously
remarked that the British Empire was acquired
in a “fit of absence of mind.”31 Was the British
colonial empire ever an unintended by-product of
“free trade” style commercial activity?
There seemed to be a great deal of deliberate
expansion going on at the very time in which
Seeley was writing. It is hard to imagine that the
massive empire of 1914, which so excited the envy
of other great powers, was the result of no policies
whatsoever. Gallagher and Robinson argue that the
empire was primarily an empire of commerce, that
the “new imperialism” of the mid to late nineteenth
century was a continuation of existing policy in

response to changing conditions, and that empire
might be formal (as with colonies) or “informal,”
as in spheres of economic hegemony, such as
Latin America.32 Territorial expansion was never
engaged in for its own sake, whether to provide
strategic depth or to pre-empt rivals. Commerce,
investment, and the protection of trade routes were
the prime motivations.33
Not everyone agreed. There were always
those who found “informal empire” too fluid
a concept, seeming to include even the U.S.A.
within a British “informal empire” (even though
the U.S.A. was itself a great power by the end
of the nineteenth century), and those who saw

Was the British colonial
empire ever an unintended
by-product of “free trade”
style commercial activity?
mid-century British free-traders as decidedly
anti-imperialist.34 D. K. Fieldhouse expressed
doubts, for far too much imperial action seemed
to lack sufficient economic justification – a
great deal of empire did not pay.35 By contrast,
and in a succession of works, D. C. M. Platt
strongly criticized the imperialism of free trade
idea, especially with reference to Latin America.
Moreover, the “new imperialism” of the late
nineteenth century was partly attributable to the
need to protect British “free trading” interests
against the protectionism of others. For Platt,
the term “the imperialism of free trade” was
insufficiently precise and therefore misleading.36
From these and related discussions there
eventually emerged a more nuanced and refocused
understanding of Victorian imperialism and freetrade convictions: the concept of “gentlemanly
capitalism,” especially as annunciated in the work
of P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins.37 The “gentlemanly
capitalism” model of global imperial commercial
activity has proved to be remarkably fruitful.
Without being overly prescriptive, it pointed to
the money-making motivation behind so much
Western activity across the rest of the world.38
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The American Empire and the British
It is in this context that two very influential
writers, working in distinct disciplines, have
helped to put empire once again at front stage.
The first is Niall Ferguson (b. 1964), a historian
of modern history, and the second N.T. “Tom”
Wright (b. 1948), a leading scholar in the field of
New Testament studies. It is hardly surprising that
both see the U.S.A.’s global reach and hegemonic
tendencies as imperial in character. Both of these
scholars are British, and while the British might not
have an empire any longer, “they know one when
they see one,” as the saying goes, and both writers
have established an extensive readership beyond
the limits of academia, not least in the U.S.A.
Niall Ferguson first came to widespread
attention with his willingness to re-consider certain
of the questions relating to Great Britain’s part in
the circumstances that led up to the outbreak of
the Great War of 1914.39 His contribution to the
literature is his Empire: The Rise and Demise of the
British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power.
This work invites its readers to see the British
Empire as a pointing to the phenomenon of
Anglophone globalization.40 For Ferguson, one of
the many tragedies arising from the First World
War was that it severely retarded the globalization
process that the British world trading system
greatly facilitated.41 Ferguson’s conclusion is
that the U.S.A. inherited Great Britain’s former
position, without fully appreciating its implications
and perils.42 The British Empire was more
benign than many other empires, but it was still
marked with crimes and injustices.43 The British
found that while empire brings a measure of
respect, and sometimes even admiration, it only
occasionally evokes gratitude and hardly ever love.
It is clear that whenever Ferguson writes about
the British imperial experience, a cross-reference
to contemporary America is not so far from his
mind. Ferguson urges Americans to consider that
their present global hegemony (challenged though
it is by violent Islamic jihad) amounts to a form
of capitalistic imperium. His Empire was quickly
followed by Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire.
For Ferguson, who does not oppose the American
empire as such, the U.S.A. is an empire significantly
in denial, lacking an adequate understanding of its
own hegemonic character.44
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Certainly within the U.S.A., over a century ago,
considerable misgivings were expressed by William
Jennings Bryan and the Anti-Imperialist League
at the time the U.S.A was acquiring a modest
formal empire, including Hawaii, the Philippines,
and Puerto Rico.45 The modern American empire
is not territorial but informal, based on finance,
commerce and cultural predominance; and it
seems to be hard for many Americans to envisage
this also as empire.46 Therefore, in the U.S.A.
the cry still goes up, “We don’t do empire.”47 Yet
such a cry belies the truth. While the U.S.A. has
engaged in some more formal “empire-building”
(in the Pacific and Caribbean) than its citizens
appreciate, America’s de facto global hegemony is
preeminently that of “informal empire” backed by
military power. 48Whereas British laissez faire style
gentlemanly capitalism found its embodiment in
the limited-liability stock company, its American
counterpart has been the even more impressive
U.S.-based multi-national business corporation.49
In Great Britain the dominance of conservatism
in the late nineteenth century tended to privilege
the financial sector over the (still largely liberal)
manufacturing interest—a trend that lasted well
into the twentieth century.50 Moreover, the English
agrarian ideal of the gentleman living on his rural
estate, with a town house in London for “the
season,” was highly influential, sidetracking many
of the more successful away from the challenges and
rewards of further enterprise and development.51
It was not so in the U.S.A. Here estate acquisition
seems not to have generally impeded individual
ambition or corporate growth and development.
The triumph of the north was the triumph of
protectionism. After the Civil War, through one
business cycle after another, shielded by a high
protective tariff but stimulated by the burgeoning
size of its domestic markets and the efficiency of
its distribution networks, American corporate
and economic growth assumed unparalleled
proportions. By 1914 the U.S.A. was the leading
power in many areas of industrial and agricultural
productivity. In one key index after another she
came to surpass Great Britain and Germany
combined. Even if the European great powers had
not torn themselves to pieces commencing in 1914,
there are strong indications that the twentieth
century would still have witnessed the rise of the
U.S.A to global preeminence. The follies, crimes,

and tragedies of Europe provided the context and
largely shaped the circumstances in which this
rise happened, but it would most probably have
happened anyway.52
After 1919 the U.S.A. was the world’s top power
economically, although she did not yet assume prime
responsibility for the global financial system. The
1939 renewal of great power hostilities in Europe,
hit hard by the post-1929 Great Depression (at
its worst in the early 1930s), breathed new life
and profitability into the spare industrial capacity
left over from the boom that had ended in 1929.
With the devastation of Europe by 1945, global
leadership (excluding the Soviet Block) inevitably
fell to the U.S.A. The Bretton Woods Agreement
(1944) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) (1947) were both ordered according

While the U.S.A. has
engaged in some more
formal “empire-building” (in
the Pacific and Caribbean)
than its citizens appreciate,
America’s de facto global
hegemony is preeminently
that of “informal empire”
backed by military power.
to American national interests. As the undisputed
economic and financial hegemon, the U.S.A now
argued for a lowering of tariffs and the promotion
of “free trade” when and where it was to her
advantage. This can be seen as an “imperialism of
free trade” of a new sort. Certainly, our presentday advocates of globalization can sometimes
sound like those British free trade stalwarts of the
nineteenth century, Richard Cobden (1804-65)
and John Bright (1811-89).53
It is significant that the American empire,
which emerged in the twentieth century, was
primarily based on inventiveness, productivity,
competitiveness, and marketing. The market-

driven, inventive fecundity of the American
mechanical imagination produced a seemingly
endless stream of product innovations and
improvements. The American-style marketing of
food has for more than a century concentrated on
“adding value” to the basic product—economic
value, that is, not necessarily nutritional value.
American production, trade, and commerce
exhibited a relentless drive to maximize
profitability through ever more sophisticated
marketing and production techniques. It was in
the U.S.A. that the techniques of mass production
came to their fullest expression: radios, washing
machines, vacuum cleaners, and automobiles in
peacetime; tanks, aircraft-carriers, liberty ships,
fighters, and bombers in wartime. First in Europe
and then around the world, successive generations
of consumers became loyal to the U.S.A.-derived
products of their choice. Eventually the time came
when conservative gentlemen might object to “new
fangled” American inventions, such as electric
razors, forgetting that Mr. K. C. Gillette’s “safety
razor” was yet another American innovation of
an earlier generation.54 It is not surprising that
America’s twentieth-century penetration of other
Western, and eventually global, markets with a
vast array of labor-saving devices and convenient
gadgets has been described by one writer as the
triumph of an irresistible empire. And all of this
was typically American, the democratic impulse
of mass marketing repeatedly overriding smaller
economies based on regional or national culture
or class-based preferences and expectations.55 This
“American Empire” has arisen at least as much
from entrepreneurial supremacy as it has from
strategic imperatives.56
To these inventive, manufacturing, and
marketing triumphs, we must add the formidably
pervasive influence of the American-based media,
including all forms of electronic entertainment—
and in America entertainment (including
professional and much other sport) is an industry.
As an alignment of powers, Wall Street, Madison
Avenue, Nashville, and Hollywood present a
formidable combination. Using all the suggestive
powers of illustration, music, and drama, they have
shaped the self-understanding and priorities of
hundreds of millions worldwide. It might be said
that they have shaped the minds—colonized the
thoughts—and formed the perceptions of these

Pro Rege—March 2008

33

multitudes. This colonization of thought has given
American styles and methods a hegemonic influence
that is unparalleled in modern history, so much
so, that Americanization and modernization have
become, to all intents and purposes, synonymous.
And all this came even before the internet and
worldwide web, which have had such a colossal
impact over the last decade. If the United States
stepped into Great Britain’s place, she did so
wearing shoes very much of her own making.
When writers today refer to “globalization”
they generally have in view the way in which
production, communication, and technology have
become connected on a global scale. The U.S. is the
prime player in agencies such as the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund in fostering
and advancing this globalizing tendency. A great
deal has come to depend on, or revolve around,
American decisions and competencies. This is our
equivalent of omnes viae Romam ducunt—all roads
lead to Rome. This is not to say that others have
no place in what some have dared to call “the new
world order.”57 On the contrary, it is rather that
others, multinational corporations from Europe or
East Asia, for example, must now conform to the
requirements of a milieu essentially shaped by their
American archetypes.58 For such Europeans and
Asians it is a case of Si fueris Romae, Romano vivito
more—“When in Rome, do as the Romans do”—
except that the new Rome is the U.S.-supervised
and -superintended economic world order.
Perhaps one of the most telling marks of America’s
hegemonic pervasiveness is its evident success
in convincing others of the universal validity of
its concept of what constitutes success. Wealth,
power, and technique combine to make the U.S.A
the cornerstone of an encompassing world-system.
Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Block
(1989-91), the United States has been described as
the “indispensable power.”59
Above all else, this “hyper-power” is
committed to advocating, advancing the scope of,
even to placing faith in, “the market” and “market
forces.” This is the context within which much
contemporary discussion about “globalization”—
also by Christians—is necessarily taking place.60
Now, therefore, we find ourselves at a historical
juncture at which we who are Christians in the
U.S.A., and the West generally, need to strain and
gasp—hunger and thirst—after righteousness
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and wisdom. This is, not least, because we need
to subject all concepts of “the market” to a most
careful, scripturally ordered analysis.
We need to grasp that “the market” is
an abstract term denoting the aggregate and
cumulative buying and selling (exchanging)
actions of countless decision makers. Moreover,
these innumerable market-place participants (both
individual and corporate) are all sinners, be they
Christians or non-Christians. Accordingly, while
an open market, justly conducted, in lawful goods,
has a legitimate and highly constructive place in
human affairs, the behavior of the market as we
know it can never constitute a norm for right
conduct and valid decision-making, because the
behavior of the market reflects not only legitimate
needs grounded in the order of creation (such as
the need for food and shelter) but also the everpresent sinful inclinations of its participants (such
as the age-old demand for prostitutes). When
everything is reduced to a commodity, everything
becomes tradable in the market place. This being
so, a “globalization” based on little more than the
presumed supremacy of “market forces” may give
leverage to a vast array of evils, even as it stands to
make some individuals and corporations very rich.
Perhaps some clarification is appropriate at this
point, if only because of the widespread tendency
in both academic and church settings to try to assess Christian thinkers as to whether they are inclining to “the left” or “the right.” The Calvinistic
understanding of the Christian religion has always
been robust in its affirmation of the sovereignty of
God. Accordingly, those who are in Calvin’s line
do not believe in the absolute sovereignty of the
church or civil administration or society or the individual or the market. These are all law-ordered
creatures. They have their own God-given authority or sovereignty in their prescribed place or
sphere. In this respect these creatures, the market
included, all represent great blessings from the
hand of Almighty God.
Nevertheless, we are in deep trouble if we ascribe authority to market demands because time
and again “the market” also reflects those demands
and ways of doing things that betray our fallen
condition. In such circumstances we can end up
legitimizing the human sin that “market demand”
inevitably reflects. It is clear that the “globalization” of “market forces,” much advocated in our

time, will do this on a massive scale. To make the
point minimally, one could say that an Americanled globalization based on “the free play of market
forces,” which ignores what the Bible says about
creation, the human condition, and our all-encompassing need for redemption, is inevitably open to
serious question.
Thirty years ago the Kuyperian-Reformational
thinker Bernard Zylstra addressed the question of
American empire with considerable prescience.61
Over the years, Christian thinkers such as Bob
Goudzwaard have reflected long and hard on the
assumptions and consequences of how capitalist
economic systems have functioned in the West
and now encompass the globe under the hegemonic leadership of the U.S.A.62 Time and again, the
“globalization” that we are offered, which so often
suits multinational corporations, pays minimal attention at best to human dignity and the cry of the
poor and dispossessed for justice.
The seeming triumph of the West under the
hegemony of the United States is replete with ambiguities for Christians, for whom Jesus Christ
(and not the market) is king. These ambiguities
are particularly evident as we consider the close
inter-weaving of Western exploration and trade
(including slavery) with Catholic and Protestant
missions (including Bible translation and dissemination) over the centuries, across Asia, Africa and
the Americas.63 The formula associated with David Livingstone (1813-1873)—“Christianity, Commerce and Civilization”—now cries out for further
critical scrutiny.64 Not least, we need to reflect on
how much the dominant culture of commerce has
shaped our understanding of the Christian faith
that we profess—even to asking ourselves if salvation has become for us a heaven-offered consumer
commodity.
The American Empire and the Romans
And now we are also being challenged to
consider the parallels between the contemporary
American empire, or hegemony, and the dominant
position of Rome at the time of first-century
Apostolic Christianity. These parallels are
pronounced in the work of Richard Horsley65 and
have been carried to a much wider readership by
the English bishop and New Testament scholar N.
T. Wright.66 Here we are confronted with a view
that sees the global reach of the American empire

as our contemporary spiritual counterpart to the
Roman imperial system everywhere evident in the
New Testament. The ambiguities are there also.
We all know that Paul used his Roman citizenship
to advantage.67 At the same time his message
was that (the lawful office of the magistrate
notwithstanding) Christ and not Caesar is Lord.
Caesar’s office was to be honored, but God alone
was to be feared (I Peter 2:17).
When Jesus said that his kingdom was not of
this world, he was not saying that it had nothing
to do with this world but that it was not founded
in any worldly principle. Christianity was not a
religio licita within the Roman Empire. It was illicit
because it would not participate in sacrificing
to emperors as divine beings. In this respect it
inevitably challenged—and challenges—Rome’s
and anyone else’s claims (explicit or implicit) to
be almighty. This is the central point about the
Christian religion that inevitably urges it towards
a public stance, however much the temptations of

This colonization of thought
has given American
styles and methods a
hegemonic influence
that is unparalleled in
modern history, so much
so, that Americanization
and modernization have
become, to all intents and
purposes, synonymous.
pietism might drive some into a world of private
devotions and closet fellowships. And it is of
no use our saying that Rome’s imperialism was
oppressive whereas America is the champion of
the “free market,” because the biblical answer is
that Christ rules and the market is not a law unto
itself: a standing legitimization of commercial
antinomianism but a means of providing all

Pro Rege—March 2008

35

humankind with lawful commodities and services
in a lawful way. Indeed, we need to reflect carefully
on the way in which the close union of Caesar’s
empire and commercial exploitation is highlighted
in the New Testament.68
In the long span of its history, the Christian
religion has another word that it would prefer
to “globalization.” That word is “ecumenical”
(oikonomia), which not only has ecclesiastical
connotations for Christians but also refers to the
economy of the entire human household (oikos),
under the peaceable rule of Jesus Christ.69 It was
once the proud boast of Habsburg monarchs that
“the sun never sets on the Spanish Empire.”70 In
their day, the British were wont to say, “The sun
never sets on the British Empire.”71 Indeed, Spain,
Britain, and America have all been tempted to
flatter themselves that they were the designated
instrument of the Almighty’s global purposes.
Such flattery is liable to back-fire when the selfdelusions of empire are unmasked by the course
of events, and the hammer blows of judgment
fall. Ferguson, in a recent paper, has argued that
there is a tendency for empires to be of decreasing
duration.72 It is possible to discern at such points a
certain eschatological “pull” within the texture of
human history as we know it. It is not given to a
single human institution to lord it over the earth.
The history of human-kind presents us with the
problem of the human condition, which cannot
be resolved from within the resources of either
human nature or human culture. The nations will
only find peace and fulfillment in all their callings
under the kingly rule of Jesus Christ.
Perhaps the greatest folly of our age is the hubris
that leads us to presume that the world belongs to
us—unless it is our current additional presumption
that we can indulge such follies with impunity. The
world does not belong to us—ultimately empire is
not ours. Rather, “our world” (the cosmos that we
have been given to cultivate and care for) belongs to
God. It is “ours” to care for and develop according
to the Creator’s command—which is always in
line with humankind’s true wellbeing. Those
Christians in these latter days who have taught us
this truth have taught us rightly, and if we bring
this truth home to ourselves, it will transform our
thinking about empire and the issues presented by
globalization.73

36

Pro Rege—March 2008

Endnotes
1. A recent annual “theme issue” of History and Theory was
devoted entirely to “Theorizing Empire.” See History
and Theory, Theme Issue 44 (December 2005): 1-131.
2. The best overview remains Friedrich Heer, The Holy
Roman Empire, tr. Janet Sondheimer (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968).
3. For a recent and very well research discussion, see
David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 61-124. See
also the fascinating paper by William M. Lamont on
“Protestant Imperialism and the English Revolution,”
in Richard Baxter and the Millennium (London: Croom
Helm, 1979), 285 ff.
4. Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations is best read in the “Glasgow Edition,”
edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S, Skinner, 2 vols
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). It is important to consider Adam Smith in his historical context,
and in this connection see the discussion offered by
Donald Winch in Adam Smith’s Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1978), noting esp. 146-163.
5. This work is replete with depreciation and innuendo
towards Christianity, especially Catholicism. Many
still regard the best edition as that edited by the rationalist historian John B. Bury (1861-1927) (London:
Macmillan, 1896-1900), 7 vols. For how the Decline and
Fall may be read with regard to late eighteenth-century
British politics, see Roy Porter, Gibbon: Making History
(London: Phoenix, 1988), 96-110.
6. Parker Thomas Moon, Imperialism and World Politics
(New York: Macmillan, 1926). European colonial rivalries were certainly part of the picture in the years
down to 1914, although arguably not part of the causes
of the conflict in the way that some anti-imperialist
writers in the 1920s envisaged. The immediate crisis
of 1911-14 was centered on the Balkans, but the wider
alignments of the great powers, which were activated
so disastrously in the crisis of July 1914, had been partly
shaped by imperial considerations.
7. See, for example, Leonard Barnes, Empire or Democracy: A Study of the Colonial Question (London: Victor
Gollancz, 1939).
8. For a sympathetic but not uncritical narration, see
Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. v., London:
Heinemann, 1976, 367-405, 464-484, 511-548 and
581-601.
9. William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United
States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

10. See George Bennett (ed.), The Concept of Empire: Burke
to Attlee, 1774-1947 (London: Adam and Charles Black,
1962), 40-43 and 134-139.
11. John Atkinson Hobson’s highly critical and widely
influential, Imperialism, A Study, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1902, dates from precisely this period. It was revised in 1905 and 1938. Cf. Peter Cain,
Hobson and Imperialism: Radicalism, New Liberalism, and
Finance 1887-1938 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), as well as his earlier “J.A. Hobson, Cobdenism,
and the Radical Theory of Economic Imperialism,
1898-1914,” Economic History Review Second Series 31
(1978), 565-584.
12. In a letter to The Times [of London] and the Daily Express, published October 7, 1922, printed by Robert
Blake, in The Unknown Prime Minister; the Life and Times of
Andrew Bonar Law, 1858-1921 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955), 447-8 at 448. See also Peter Rowland,
David Lloyd George: A Biography (London: Macmillan,
1975), 578-580.
13. Readers will recall that at this stage the U.S.A was officially neutral, and the Russo-German non-aggression
pact of August 1939 was still in operation. The German
attack on Russia by no means guaranteed that Great
Britain would survive the German threat. Germany
had defeated Russia in 1917/18, and might do so again,
and so further augment the immense resources that
might eventually be deployed against Great Britain.
14. See Iriye Akira, The Globalizing of America (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), esp. 191-215.
15. See James Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain’s Eastern Empire, 1919-1941 (Oxford University Press, 1981); Ian Hamill, The Strategic Illusion: the
Singapore Strateg y and the Defense of Australia and New Zealand, 1919-1942 (Singapore: Singapore University Press,
1981); Alan Warren, Singapore, 1942: Britain’s Greatest Defeat, London: The Hambledon Press, 2002); and Noel
Barber, Sinister Twilight: The Fall of Singapore, London:
Cassell, 2002). For an account from a Japanese standpoint, see Masanobu Tsuji, Japan’s Greatest Victory Britain’s Worst Defeat, edited by H. V. Howe (New York: De
Capo Press, 1997). For an Australian view, see Jacqui
Murray, Watching the Sun Rise: Australian reporting of Japan,
1931 to the Fall of Singapore (Lexington Books, 2004).
16. The literature on the independence of the Indian subcontinent is itself vast, but the essay by John Higgins,
“Partition in India: The Atlee Government and the
Independence of India and Pakistan,” in Age of Austerity, ed. Michael Sissons and Philip French (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1963), at 191-207, effectively
captures the British sense of the end of the raj. For a
recent overview see Judith M. Brown, “India,” in The
Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. iv: The Twentieth

Century, ed. Judith M. Brown and William Roger Louis
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 420-445.
17. For an American view of this process, see Robert S.
Thompson, The Eagle Triumphant: How America took over
the British Empire (Hoboken NJ: John Wiley, 2004), and
for two British views, see David Reynolds, Britannia
Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century
(London: Longman, 1991), and Anne Orde, The United
States and British Imperial Decline, 1895-1956 (London:
Macmillan, 1996). For a discussion of an earlier crucial
decade, see Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain
and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press), 1988.
18. See Warren I. Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power,
1945-1991 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1993), 36-39.
19. Charles Edmund Carrington, The British Overseas: Exploits of a Nation of Shopkeepers (Cambridge University
Press, 1950). In the 1968 the publishers issued a contracted “Part One” in a “second edition” which excised various sections, including those later regarded
as acceptable.
20. The account by Henri Grimal, in Decolonization: The
British, French, Dutch and Belgian Empires (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) has achieved
early recognition. For a more recent discussion, see
John Springhall, Decolonization Since 1945: The Collapse
of European Overseas Empires (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2001).
21. Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience: The
Durham Report to the Anglo-Irish Treaty (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson / New York: Praeger, 1969), The
Commonwealth of Nations: Studies in British Commonwealth
Relations (London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1948), and Survey of the British Commonwealth,
1939-1952 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952).
22. Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset I: Britain’s Liberal Empire,
1897-1921 (London: Methuen, 1969), and Dream of Commonwealth, 1921-1942 (London: Macmillan, 1989).
23. Corelli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London:
Eyre Methuen, 1972), The Audit of War: The Illusion and
Reality of Britain as a Great Nation (London: Macmillan,
1986), The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities,
1945-1950 (London: Macmillan, 1995), and The Verdict
of Peace: Britain between her Past and her Future (London:
Macmillan, 2001).
24. James Morris, Heaven’s Command: An Imperial Progress;
Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire, and Farewell the
Trumpets: An Imperial Retreat (London: Faber and Faber,
1973, 1968 and 1978 respectively).
25. A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study
in British Power (London: Macmillan, 1959), esp. 108 ff.

Pro Rege—March 2008

37

26. See R. W. Seton Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the
Eastern Question (London: Macmillan, 1935), C. C. Eldridge, England’s Mission: The Imperial Idea in the Age of
Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-1880, (London: Macmillan,
1973), esp. 234-255, and Disraeli and the Rise of a New
Imperialism (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996).

Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. ii (Cambridge
University Press, 1940), at 399. See also, H. S. Ferns,
“Britain’s Informal Empire in Argentina, 1806-1914,”
Past and Present 4 (1953), 60-75, and “Britain’s Informal
Empire in Uruguay during the Nineteenth Century,”
Past and Present 73 (1976), 100-126.

27. By training Koebner was a medievalist. He was forced to
quit his position at the University of Breslau by the Nazi’s. He held the Chair of Modern History at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem from 1934 to 1955. He eventually gave his name to the “Richard Koebner Center for
German History” at the University of Jerusalem.

33. Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free
Trade,” op cit, 13-15

28. In the (English) Act of Supremacy, of 1534, reference was
made to “the imperial Crown of this realm.”
29. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade”in Economic History Review Second Series 6 (1953): 1-15. These authors subsequently
collaborated with Alice Denny to produce Africa and
the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent (London: Macmillan / New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1961). See also their “The Partition of Africa,”
in The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume xi, ed. F.
H. Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1962): 593-640.
30. The classic discussion is by Robert Livingston Schuyler,
The Fall of the Old Colonial System: A Study in British Free
Trade, 1770-1870 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1945). For the British Empire after Yorktown, the
magisterial work remains that of Vincent T. Harlow,
The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793
(London: Longmans, Green, 2 vols, 1952, 1964). See
also Bernard Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism:
Classical Political Economy and the Empire of Free Trade
and Imperialism, 1750-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970) and The Liberal Ideal and the
Demons of Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1993).
31. John Robert Seeley, The Expansion of England, London:
Macmillan, 1883, 1. On the man and his book, see
Deborah Wormell, Sir John Seeley and the Uses of History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), esp.
at 93-99 and 154 ff. An argument against any view of
Australia being settled in a “fit of absence of mind”
has been presented by Alan Atkinson in The Europeans
in Australia, Vol. i, The Beginning (Melbourne, Oxford
University Press, 1997). The “absence of mind” notion
has proved to be remarkably enduring. See Bernard
Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire Society
and Culture in Great Britain (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006).
32. Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free
Trade,” op cit, 1, 7-10. The term “informal empire,” as
the writers note, (at 1 n. 1) was used by C. R. Fay in the

38

Pro Rege—March 2008

34. For example, see Oliver MacDonagh, “The AntiImperialism of Free Trade,” Economic History Review
Second Series 14 (1962): 489- 501, esp. 489, n. 1, and
500-1.
35. D. K. Fieldhouse, “’Imperialism’: An Historical Revision,” The Economic History Review Second Series 14
(1961): 187-209, esp. at 196-7, 200 and 208-9.
36. D. C. M. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign
Policy, 1815-1914 (Oxford University Press, 1968), Latin
America and British Trade, 1806-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1972), and Britain’s Investments Overseas on the Eve
of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 1986). The
relevant articles include “Economic Factors in British
Policy during the ‘New Imperialism’,” Past and Present
39 (1968): 120-138; “The Imperialism of Free Trade:
Some Reservations,” Economic History Review Second
Series 21 (1968): 296-306; and “Further Objections to
an Imperialism of Free Trade,” Economic History Review
Second Series 26 (1973): 77-91.
37. Peter J. Cain and Anthony G. Hopkins, “Gentlemanly
Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas,” in Economic History Review Second Series 39 (1986): 501-525 and
40 (1987): 1-26; British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 (London: Longman, 1993), esp. 141 ff.,
and British Imperialism, 1688-2000 (London: Longman
2001). See also the discussions in Gentlemanly Capitalism
and the British Empire: The New Debate on Empire, as edited
by Raymond E. Dumet (London: Longman, 1999). For
the response of D. K. Fieldhouse, see his “Gentlemen,
Capitalists, and the British Empire,” in Journal of Imperial
and Commonwealth History 22 (1994): 531-541.
38. See also Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback,
Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
39. Niall Ferguson, “Public Finance and National Security: The Domestic Origins of the First World War
Revisited,”in Past and Present 142 (1994): 141-168, which
should be read in the wake of his earlier review essay, “Germany and the Origins of the First World
War: New Perspectives,” in Historical Journal 35 (1992):
725-752. The big work is The Pity of War: Explaining
World War I (London: Allen Lane / New York: Basic
Books, 1998). In this context note esp. xxxvii-xl, and
51-104. See also Ferguson’s “The Kaiser’s European
Union: What if Britain had ‘stood aside’ in August

1914?” in Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals,
ed. Ferguson (London: Picador, 1997), 228-280.
40. Niall Fergusson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British
World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (London: Allen Lane 2002 / New York: Basic Books, 2003); note
esp. xxii-xxix.
41. Niall Ferguson, “Sinking Globalization,” Foreign Affairs 84 (2005), 64-77, esp. 66-69.
42. Niall Ferguson, Empire, op cit, 367 ff.
43. Strong arguments can be formulated to support the
assertion that the British Empire was among the least
oppressive in global history, but it was also capable of
injustice and tyranny even towards the very end. See,
for example, Vytautas B. Bandjunis, Diego Garcia: Creation of the Indian Ocean Base (Writer’s Showcase Press,
2001), and Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry
Holt, 2005).
44. Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire
(New York: Penguin Press, 2004), esp. 6-13, 65-69,
201-225 and 290-295.
45. William Miller, A New History of the United States, (London: Faber and Faber, 1958), 325-6, 334-335. See also
Walter La Feber, The American Search for Opportunity,
1865-1913 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1993), 129-182, esp. 178-181. The Spanish-American
war was pivotal: see Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy:
The Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1961).
46. As early as 1960, in England, the Historical Association
published a booklet, by R. W. Van Alstyne, entitled The
American Empire: Its Historical Pattern and Evolution.
47. Bernard Porter, Empire and Super Empire: Britain, America and the World (New Haven CT: Yale University Press,
2006), esp. 93-133.
48. See the discussion of “full spectrum dominance” offered by Andrew J. Bacevich in American Empire: The
Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 117 ff., cf. the
conclusion on “War for Imperium” at 225 ff. This author is clear that “America today is Rome” at 244.
49. The origins of the modern Anglo-American style limited liability corporation lie in the (British) Joint Stock
Companies Act of 1844, as amended and developed by
the Limited Liability Act of 1855. In the next decade
or so, comparable changes were made to French and
Belgian as well as to American state laws.
50. For a castigation of Treasury policy in post-war Great
Britain, see Sidney Pollard, The Wasting of the British
Economy: British Economic Policy 1945 to the Present (London: Croom Helm, 1982), esp. 71 ff.

51. See the argument presented by Martin J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp.
81-154.
52. An almost forgotten literature points us in this direction, e.g., William Thomas Stead, The Americanization of
the World, or the Trend of the Twentieth Century (New York:
Marckley, 1901); Christopher Furness, The American
Invasion (London: Simkin Marshall, 1902), F. A. Mackenzie, The American Invaders (London: Grant Richards,
1902), Ludwell Denny, America Conquers Britain: A
Record of Economic War (New York: Knopf, 1930), and
in the crucial year: Henry Luce, The American Century
(New York: Time, 1941).
53. See Donald Read, Cobden and Bright: A Victorian Political Partnership (London: Edward Arnold, 1967). Cf.
George Bennett (ed.), The Concept of Empire: Burke to Attlee, 1774-1947, op cit., 165-175.
54. This product was first marketed by the Gillette Safety
Razor Company in 1903.
55. For some fascinating insights, see Victoria de Grazia,
Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th-Century
Europe. For an even more recent study see Michael
Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and
America’s Civilizing Mission (Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press, 2005 and 2006 respectively).
56. See the discussion offered by William E. Odom and
Robert Dujarric in America’s Inadvertent Empire (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), esp. at 36-63.
Note how the reference to inadvertency alludes to Seeley’s sense of British imperial expansion.
57. Speech to a joint session of Congress by (the first)
President Bush, entitled “Toward a New World Order,”
September 11, 1990.
58. See the discussion offered by Charles S. Maier, in
Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006),
esp. 24-77 and 191-284.
59. This expression was used on more than one occasion
by Madeleine Albright, former U.S. Secretary of State
(1997-2001) and onetime U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (1993-97).
60. For a Christian contribution see the papers edited by
Peter Heslam in Globalization and the Good (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), esp. the contributions by Ann Pettifor, Michael Schluter and Timothy Gorringe at 52-91. See also Heslam’s Globalization:
Unraveling the New Capitalism (Cambridge: Grove, revised ed., 2004). For more fully developed reflections,
see God and Globalization, vol. i: Religion and the Powers
of the Common Life, ed. Max L. Stackhouse and Peter
J. Paris; God and Globalization, vol. ii: The Spirit and the

Pro Rege—March 2008

39

Modern Authorities, ed. Max L. Stackhouse and Don S.
Browning; and God and Globalization, Vol. iii: Christ and
the Dominions of Civilization, ed. Max L. Stackhouse and
Diane B. Obenchain (all Harrisburg PA: Trinity Press
International, 2000, 2001, and 2002 respectively). A
further volume is anticipated.
61. Bernard Zylstra, “Modernity and the American Empire,” in International Reformed Bulletin numbers 68/69
(1977): 3-19.
62. Cf. Bob Goudzwaard, Aid for the Overdeveloped West (Toronto: Wedge, 1975); Capitalism and Progress: A Diagnosis
of Western Society (Toronto: Wedge, 1979); “Norms for
the International Economic Order” (with John van
Baars) in Justice in the International Economic Order (Grand
Rapids MI: Calvin College, 1980), 223-253; Idols of our
Time (Downers Grove IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1984);
(with Harry de Lange) Beyond Povery and Affluence: Toward an Economy of Care (Grand Rapids MI: William B.
Eerdmans, 1995); and Globalization and the Kingdom of
God (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Books, 2001). At the
time of writing, a further study, Hope in Troubled Times:
A New Vision for Confronting Global Crises, is forthcoming.
63. See the very perceptive discussion by Brian Stanley,
“‘Commerce and Christianity’: Providence Theory,
The Missionary Movement, and the Imperialism of
Free Trade, 1842-1860,” in Historical Journal 26 (1983):
71-94. See also the more recent essays collected in
Christian Missions and the Enlightenment, ed. Brian Stanley; The Imperial Horizons of British Protestant Missions,
1880-1914, ed. Andrew Porter; and Missions, Nationalism, and the End of Empire, ed. Brian Stanley (all Grand
Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2001, 2003, and
2004 respectively).
64. It was Livingstone’s destiny to become a revered symbol of the nineteenth-century British Empire in Africa.
The literature on Livingstone is heavy with evangelical hagiography, but for some shrewd discussion of the
context and content of the profoundly anti-slavery formu-

40

Pro Rege—March 2008

la— “Christianity, commerce and civilization”—see
Andrew C. Ross, David Livingstone: Mission and Empire
(London: The Hambledon Press, 2002), esp. 24-25,
117-123 and 239-244.
65. Richard Horsley, Jesus and Empire: The Kingdom of God
and the New World Disorder (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 2003), esp. 129-149. See also the papers edited
by Horsley, in Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in
Roman Imperial Society (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press
International, 1997).
66. N. T. Wright, What Saint Paul Really Said: Was Paul of
Tarsus the Real Founder of Christianity? (Grand Rapids MI:
William B. Eerdmans, 1997), 88; “Paul’s Gospel and
Caesar’s Empire,” in Paul and Politics, ed. Richard A.
Horsley (Harrisburg PA: Trinity Press international,
2000), 160-183; and Paul in Fresh Perspective (Minneapolis MN: Fortress Press, 2005), 59-79.
67. Acts 16: 37-39; 22: 22-29.
68. Acts 19: 25-28; Revelation 18: 11-19.
69. Cf. Bob Goudzwaard, Globalization and the Kingdom of
God, op cit, 19-22. Our word “hegemony,” by contrast,
is derived from the Greek hegemonia, which implies
dominance enforced on possibly reluctant subjects.
The “hegemon” is the dominant party in such a relationship.
70. Friedrich Heer, The Holy Roman Empire, op cit,
160-175.
71. The notion survives even in the age of the internet. See
“The Sun Never Set on the British Empire / Dominion over
Palm and Pine,” at http://www.fresian.com/british.htm
72. Niall Ferguson, “Empires with Expiration Dates,”
Foreign Policy (September / October 2006): 1 ff.
73. See “Our World Belongs to God: A Contemporary
Testimony,” in the Psalter Hymnal of the Christian Reformed Church 4th ed. (Grand Rapids MI: CRC Publications, 1987), 1019-1038.

